Commentary

Context  Romania adopted Government Decision No. 318/2024 in April 2024, introducing a Contracts for Difference (CfD) scheme to support low-carbon emissions technologies. Throughout the summer of 2024, ANRE set out the methodology for determining and collecting CfD contributions, and the Ministry of Energy approved the state aid scheme.   The first CfD auction has concluded and successfully procured the target c. 1.5 GW of installed capacity (1,096 MW for onshore wind and 432 MW for solar). Following the technical evaluation, 47 bids were eligible for financial evaluation with 21 applicants awarded contracts. Maximum prices were set at €78/MWh for solar and €82/MWh for onshore wind and a weighted average of the strike prices were €51/MWh for solar and €65/MWh for wind, representing good value for money. A second auction with 3.5 GW (1.5 GW for onshore wind and 2.0 GW for solar) is scheduled for the third quarter of 2025. Future auctions may include other technologies, such as offshore wind and nuclear.   A CfD contract will last for 15 years. The Modernisation Fund supports the scheme with €3 billion until 2030, after which the cost of maintaining it is to be passed onto the consumer bills. This guaranteed revenue stream over 15 years enables developers to secure financing by ensuring predictable payback periods and minimum returns on investment, protecting investors from market fluctuations.   CfDs are an important tool meant to shield select power generation technologies from market volatility and to provide long-term stability. Despite this successful first auction, though, the Romanian renewables sector is still proceeding with caution, as some language in the CfD contract is less comforting than it first appeared.  Industry concerns  Concerns over stability have been raised by some stakeholders, notably that the contract as written offers limited projection for power generators that are taking on more risk with the Romanian CfD than in CfD schemes in other states.   Reference price methodology   The draft methodology for setting the reference price has been viewed positively by industry, although the final methodology has yet to be released by the energy regulator. The reference price definition poses a risk to generators as ANRE reserves the right to revisit the methodology at any point if they consider that the reference price is not adequately reflecting market trends. However, how exactly ANRE is to (re)assess the situation is not clear. This is a surprising contractual clause considering that the reference price is based on the average day-ahead power market, which should be a straightforward market reading. EPG suggests that wording around adjusting the reference price methodology should at least be limited to a specific percentage point to allow electricity producers to model for the worst-case scenario when deciding on submitting a bid in future auction rounds.   Consumer Price Index  Concerns have been raised over the absence of cumulative Consumer Price Index (CPI) evolution. In theory, the CfD strike price should be adjusted every three years based on CPI; however, adjustment only applies if CPI increases more than 10%. Therefore, any inflation below 10% will not be adjusted for, leaving generators to deal with losses based on inflation of up to that threshold. Indeed, CPI-based adjustments are in line with the Eurozone Consumer Price Index, which is generally more conservative than the Romanian CPI. The long-term nature of CfDs means that real inflation could outstrip CfD payments and significantly impact returns. The unbalanced burden of managing inflation falling on the generator does not match the de-risking purpose of a CfD.   State unilateral exit   The state has the right to unilaterally terminate a CfD contract at its convenience, which many in industry find unacceptable and undermining the scheme’s very sense: to allow for a long-term, predictable revenue stream.   Under this clause, the generator is entitled to payments which theoretically should amount to what they would have received had the contract lasted to full fruition. As always, though, the devil is in the details and the methodology used for calculating the termination payment is not clear-cut. Based on the formulas outlined in the contract, the termination compensation should equate to the generator’s market loss based on the historical weighted average of CfD difference payments since the start date and metered output from the previous year, including a discount rate. However, the generator risks the state terminating the contract following a stable year before the market takes a turn, leaving the generator to carry the burden alone. If the market remains relatively stable, the termination amount would reasonably closely match what the generator should have received. In this situation, though, why would the government choose to exit the contract?   Besides, the reference price calculations will play a significant role in the level of termination fee paid to generators. If these values are transparent and fair, there is a scenario where the generator is fairly compensated, but a clause which allows one party to unilaterally terminate the contract without cause does not inspire confidence.  Regulatory aspects outside the generator’s control  The responsibility of achieving grid connection (ATR) falls on the electricity producer’s shoulders, with little recourse if decisions from the TSO are outside their control. At the auction stage, bidders must evidence the application for ATR. However, they are responsible for achieving ATR within six months of signing the CfD contract, and some bidders have justifiably expressed concerns over tight timelines, especially as decisions around grid connections are in the control of the TSO, while bidders have little control over the decision-making timelines.   The Government Ordinance 59/2013 stipulates that grid connection must be granted by the TSO within six months of application, but in practice it can take over a year. Generators therefore take a risk of not being granted connection agreements on time. The TSO’s ability to accommodate an influx of new grid connection agreements is known to be facing difficulties. If the TSO cannot come to a decision in the 6-month timeline, the CfD Counterpart is within their rights to enforce performance bonds on the bidder. Similarly, the process to obtain a building permit is not guaranteed and the risk of failure or delays may also affect the generator’s ability to see...

Heavy industry, an engine for development The EU’s heavy industry is under enormous pressure. Across the continent, producers of steel, cement, chemicals, and other essential materials are announcing expensive transformation plans to maintain their competitiveness in a low-carbon world, while struggling to compete with cheap imports and to overcome the current sluggish demand for green products. Said transformation plans are often dependent on state-led infrastructure development – both for enabling their execution (such as carbon dioxide transport infrastructure for carbon management projects) and for creating lead markets to increase the certainty of investment payback (for example, long-term contracts for purchasing green steel at a premium price tag). They are also costly, both in terms of capital and operational expenses, and will require innovative financial and fiscal instruments, including private sector mobilisation, to ensure deployment at the pace required to keep EU industries operating and competing within emissions and resource constraints. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), heavy industry is both more emissions-intensive and more economically important than in the rest of the Union. Transforming it to a low-carbon industry could bring a significant payoff in terms of economic development and safeguarding of jobs than in other countries. The demand for carbon-intensive products is also unquestionable, with the rapid economic development of CEE countries requiring large volumes of construction materials. However, the CEE countries’ climate policy push is also weaker, public purses are more constrained, and the recent fomenting of far-right agendas may put social “green-lash” high on the list of challenges facing industrial transformation. Under stringent EU climate targets, CEE border countries such as Romania and Bulgaria also face a higher risk of incurring an industrial trade deficit due to their proximity to cheap extra-EU industrial production - even in regional markets judged to have low trade intensity (such as cement). Transforming CEE industry is therefore as challenging as it is necessary – and its dependence on both infrastructure development and creative funding mechanisms, outlined above, may just be the key to achieving it. The Cohesion Policy, a facilitator of development The progress of CEE countries in reducing their industrial emissions over the last three decades has been mostly driven by downsizing or shutting down legacy economically inefficient industrial facilities from the communist regime. As in the rest of Europe, concerns about competitiveness are reshaping the decarbonisation agenda to a dual “joint decarbonisation and development” approach. For Central and Eastern Europe, this notion of development is still very much predicated (though likely not for much longer) on regional convergence with wealthier EU regions. This offers an opening into combining the economic development imperative with the need to mobilise finance for industrial decarbonisation in a way that can foster regional economic cohesion: the EU Cohesion Policy. The EU Cohesion Policy, the “prime investment policy of the EU” is a broad funding mechanism aiming to reduce the economic, social, and territorial disparities still evident between more developed and less developed European countries. It is delivered through four main funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), and Just Transition Fund (JTF). The majority of this funding is allocated to CEE countries: of a total of €392 billion in the 2021-2027 financial period, Poland alone was allocated nearly €80 billion, and remaining CEE countries and Greece a total of €150 billion. A substantial share of Cohesion Policy funding goes towards infrastructure, particularly transport. In the 2014-2020 period, the single largest direct beneficiaries of funding were the Polish and Romanian national companies for roads and highways, receiving just over €13 billion. Total funding for network infrastructures in transport and energy amounted to €66 billion, while funding for low-carbon transformation totalled €50 billion, out of a total of €531 billion planned. The primary funding instruments for investment in these domains are the CF and ERDF. The substantial share of Cohesion Policy funding available for investment in CEE infrastructure and low-carbon transformation highlights two things. Firstly, there is a well-established funding instrument for the economic development of less developed European regions, much of which goes to large construction projects requiring substantial volumes of steel, concrete, and other construction products. Secondly, there is an opportunity to improve the efficiency of Cohesion Policy funding (already a heated topic in Brussels), by conditioning infrastructure spending on climate performance and mobilising investments in low-carbon products and services as part of a broad industrial transformation. Aligning development with climate through public procurement criteria How could climate conditionalities be implemented within Cohesion Policy infrastructure spending? One solution is to leverage the role of public entities as buyers of the products and services needed to develop new infrastructure. With the vast majority of CEE countries directing most of their funding to public entities, public procurement criteria applied to Cohesion Policy spending could unlock demand for industrial products meeting certain specifications – including their environmental and climate impact, with strong social safeguards in place. Incorporating climate and environmental criteria into public procurement is far from a new idea, but is not legally mandated at EU level. Instead, the EU has a voluntary scheme for Green Public Procurement (GPP), covering fourteen categories of products – two of which are suitable for generating demand for clean industrial products to the scale required for a genuine transformation of heavy industry (office building construction and road construction). While some Member States have adopted their own Green Public Procurement frameworks at national level, these are mostly absent in Central and Eastern Europe (with some exceptions, for example Lithuania), or where they do exist, they include relatively vague criteria on the emissions and environmental performance of industrial products (e.g., Romania’s recently published GPP action plan). Leveraging the existing framework for GPP criteria could serve as a starting point for introducing climate conditionalities in the disbursement of Cohesion Policy funding instruments. This means that Member States, who are responsible for selecting projects to be funded under these instruments, can introduce product-level or project-level criteria into their funding contracts, ensuring that beneficiaries (public and private alike) implement such criteria to reduce the life-cycle...

In 2024, the EU proposed a target of reducing GHG emissions by 90% by 2040, compared to 1990 levels. This target not only secures the pathway to climate neutrality by 2050, but also gives a clear signal of what the 2030-2040 decade will look in terms of fossil fuel phase-out, cleantech development and just transition, among others. The proposed 2040 target underscores the EU's commitment to aligning with the Paris Agreement while making significant progress towards its long-term goal of climate neutrality by 2050. To help reach the Union’s climate targets, Member States are required under the EU Governance Regulation to develop long-term strategies for climate change mitigation. Romania’s Long-term Strategy (LTS), adopted in 2023, sets a target of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, provides a framework for interim targets, and proposes policies to achieve a cohesive and sustainable approach to climate change mitigation. It defines a clear interim target of 78% emission reduction by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels), reaching 91% in 2040. The adopted LTS could enhance Romania's contribution to he EU’s collective emission reduction efforts and achievement of climate neutrality by 2050. These interim goals serve as benchmarks on the pathway towards achieving Romania’s longterm climate objectives, as they enhance predictability, safeguard against potential setbacks, and enable earlier investments in new technologies and infrastructure. Although the LTS aligns with the proposed EU 2040 target, Romania does not have a legally binding target for 2040 and the strategy still exhibits gaps and uncertainties regarding its implementation. These shortcomings add to other challenges Romania faces in meeting its climate objectives, especially given its reliance on fossil fuels, hard-to-abate industries, regulatory uncertainties and limited fiscal capacity. Uncertainties and risks may also arise from various technological, economic, or political factors, as well as public resistance to climate policies and geopolitical shocks. These risks must be mitigated through clear, robust policies and commitments at national and sectoral level.   Moreover, Romania has already submitted to the Commission the final version of its updated NECP (which is more ambitious than the LTS) and has adopted other key sectoral strategies (the National Hydrogen Strategy, the National Adaptation Strategy, the National Energy Strategy and the Romanian Industrial Strategy 2024-2030). According to the Governance Regulation, Member States should update their long-term strategies only if they deem it necessary. To align with the latest national and EU policy developments, enhance coherence, and increase certainty in the achievement of existing emissions targets and trajectories, a revision of the existing LTS may be due. Ioana Vasiliu, EPG Senior Researcher Ioana works as a Senior Researcher within the Clean Economy Programme of EPG. She holds a bachelor degree in management for public administration and a post university diploma as expert for sustainable development both from the Economic Academy of Bucharest. Before joining EPG, Ioana worked for Romanian Ministry of Environment, Waters and Forests as european affairs advisor within Climate Strategies and Reporting Department. Over the last years, she has been involved in addressing climate change at national level, by developing policies and strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the effects and impacts of climate change. At international level she acted as rapporteur for climate change adaptation policies and NECP, is member of UNFCCC expert roster and coordinated Romania’s accession process to the OECD, in the field of climate change. Contact: ioana.vasiliu@enpg.ro

Achizițiile publice pot crea noi oportunități pentru dezvoltarea industriei cu emisii reduse de carbon  Ambițiile europene în materie de climă și mediu asumate prin Pactul Verde European responsabilizează statele europene, inclusiv operatorii industriali să își reducă în mod accelerat emisiile. Acest lucru presupune, printre altele, utilizarea de noi tehnologii inovatoare, înlocuirea combustibililor fosili cu surse curate de energie și eficientizarea consumului de resurse și  energie. Transformarea fundamentală a industriei va fi, prin urmare, un proces de durată, care va necesita investiții majore din partea operatorilor industriali, dar și suport din partea statului pentru acoperirea costurilor semnificative de investiții, pentru extinderea și dezvoltarea infrastructurii necesare. Există mai multe mijloace prin care decarbonizarea industriei ar putea fi susținută de către stat, fie că vorbim de facilități fiscale, granturi și subvenții sau mecanisme legislative de stimulare a cererii pentru produse cu emisii reduse de carbon, cum sunt sistemele de Achiziții Publice Ecologice (APE). Sistemele APE reprezintă procesul prin care autoritățile publice urmăresc să achiziționeze lucrări, bunuri sau servicii, care au un impact redus asupra mediului de-a lungul întregului ciclu de viață, în detrimentul produselor cu emisii ridicate de carbon. Potrivit economiștilor, este o alternativă mai eficientă pentru susținerea industriei în procesul de tranziție verde, cu impact mai limitat asupra bugetului național. Acest aspect este esențial pentru România, o țară cu spațiu fiscal redus comparativ cu state precum Germania și Franța, unde se acordă ajutoare de stat semnificative pentru decarbonizarea industriei. Prin implementarea unui sistem APE funcțional, industria din România ar beneficia de predictibilitate și susținere în procesul de decarbonizare, menținându-și astfel competitivitatea pe plan european și global. În contextul presiunii legislative europene de reducere graduală a emisiilor de carbon, implementarea unui asemenea mecanism va contribui atât la creșterea avantajului competitiv al României, pe termen mediu și lung, cât și la atingerea țintelor de reducere a emisiilor la nivel național. Care este legătura între competitivitatea industriei și APE? Ultimii cinci ani au fost marcați de dezvoltarea și actualizarea unor politici europene esențiale în transformarea industriei. Pe lângă multiplele directive europene din cadrul pachetului Fit-for-55, declarațiile Comisiei Europene, din ultimele luni, au adus în prim plan importanța decarbonizării industriei în menținerea competitivității pe piețele globale. Potrivit unui studiu EPG, în absența unor măsuri concertate de decarbonizare, până în 2030, costul total de emisii pentru industriile oțelului, cimentului și chimicalelor din România va crește de patru ori, comparativ cu 2024. Această creștere generează un risc real de mărire a costurilor de producție, reducerea sau chiar relocarea facilităților de producție. Impactul asupra României ar putea fi, prin urmare, unul semnificativ. Sectorul industrial contribuie cu 22,8% din Valoarea Adăugată Brută și asigură aproximativ 20% din actualele locuri de muncă. Mai mult, anumite industrii energo-intensive sunt importante din punct de vedere strategic pentru România, precum producția de oțel primar, care în alte țări din regiune dispare gradual, riscând astfel o dependență crescută de importuri. Pe de altă parte, emisiile generate de industrie însumează 14% din emisiile naționale, iar reducerea lor va implica în multe cazuri transformarea fundamentală a proceselor industriale, cu costuri investiționale semnificative. Sistemele de APE reprezintă un instrument de sprijin indirect în procesul de decarbonizare. Ca urmare a implementării planurilor complexe de transformare industrială, acestea pot aduce un plus de predictibilitate și certitudine în ceea ce privește cererea pentru produsele industriale verzi. Implementarea unui sistem de APE în România ar genera cerere previzibilă pentru produsele ecologice din partea unui cumpărător major (statul)dispus să achiziționeze cantități semnificative de materiale cu o amprentă redusă de carbon. Statul este cel mai mare achizitor: în 2023, ponderea achizițiilor publice la PIB-ul țării a ajuns la 19% în anul 2023 (aprox. 61 miliarde de euro), de la 8% în 2018. Mai mult, aproape un sfert din valoarea totală a achizițiilor publice este reprezentată de lucrările de construcții, care utilizează cantități semnificative de beton, oțel, și alte produse ale industriei energo-intensive, unde procesul de decarbonizare va fi cel mai complex. Achizițiile publice pentru aceste categorii de lucrări vor continua să crească (spre exemplu, România s-a angajat să aloce circa 2% din PIB anual pentru proiectele de infrastructură și transport, până în 2030). În plus, o proporție semnificativă a investițiilor în infrastructură este realizată prin fonduri europene, inclusiv prin Planul Național pentru Redresare și Reziliență, care condiționează realizarea proiectelor de îndeplinirea criteriilor verzi. Prin urmare, achizițiile publice ecologice pot influența în mod semnificativ evoluția și înverzirea economiei, iar investițiile în infrastructură și construcții ar putea deveni un instrument relevant de influențare a pieței pentru decarbonizarea industriei energo-intensive din România. Rolul Planului Național de Acțiune pentru Achiziții Publice Ecologice 2024 – 2027 Până în prezent, utilizarea achizițiilor publice ca instrument strategic de decarbonizare a fost sporadic aplicat în UE, unde prețul cel mai mic reprezintă cel mai important criteriu de evaluare pentru peste jumătate din achizițiile publice din statele membre. La nivelul UE, există un cadru voluntar de APE, prin intermediul căruia au fost definite criterii ecologice pentru 14 categorii de produse, servicii și lucrări. Aceste criterii au fost adoptate integral sau parțial de anumite state membre (precum Olanda, Suedia și Italia), fiind stabilite ținte progresive anuale în cadrul planurilor naționale de APE.  Criteriile se bazează pe instrumente precum evaluarea impactului pe întregul ciclu de viață (LCA) sau standarde și etichete ecologice, printre altele. Suplimentar față de criteriile voluntare, există câteva directive europene, cum ar fi Directiva privind Performanța Energetică a Clădirilor, ce includ criterii obligatorii care trebuie să se regăsească în achizițiile publice la nivel național. Deși au caracter voluntar, obiectivul planurilor naționale de APE este de a transmite semnale clare pieței că există cerere pentru produse și servicii cu emisii reduse, precum și de a pregăti autoritățile publice și operatorii economici pentru achiziții complexe, cum sunt cele ce prevăd criterii ecologice. România a adoptat Legea privind Achizițiile Publice Verzi în 2016, iar în 2023 a publicat Strategia Națională în domeniul Achizițiilor Publice (2023-2027). Recent, în septembrie 2024, Ministerul Mediului, Apelor și Pădurilor a lansat spre consultare publică noul Plan de Acțiune al României pentru Achiziții Publice Ecologice 2024-2027, care va înlocui planul expirat încă din 2013. Noul plan include o listă...

Transformarea industriei: o necesitate presantă În contextul geopolitic și economic actual, politicile industriale din Uniunea Europeană sunt esențiale pentru a asigura securitatea, prosperitatea și atenuarea schimbărilor climatice. Un nou val de politici și scheme de suport, axate pe transformarea sustenabilă a industriilor statelor membre, reflectă o reorientare a gândirii strategice atât la nivel european cât și național. Astfel, mult-așteptatul raport al lui Mario Draghi a propus o abordare duală a problematicii tranziției industriale axată pe obiectivele de decarbonizare și competitivitate, două dimensiuni strâns întrepătrunse, care trebuie abordate concomitent. În acest sens, este nevoie de un mix de politici și stimulente economice care să permită operatorilor industriali, mai ales din industriile energo-intensive, să se transforme și să poată concura pe piețele europene și globale, cu o expunere cât mai redusă la vulnerabilități pe lanțul de producție. Aceste semnale au fost preluate de către decidenții din România, rezultând în noi angajamente de susținere și finanțare a marii industrii.Deși binevenite, mecanismele propuse abordează doar parțial provocările de competitivitate ale industriei românești și cel mai probabil, în forma actuală nu vor reuși să prevină decalajul României față de alte state europene. Cum susține România transformarea industriei sale? Istoricul schemelor de suport pentru industria grea din România reflecta, până recent, o abordare monolitică și prea puțin mulată pe complexitățile tehnologice, comerciale, și sociale ale tranziției industriale. Din 2010 și până în prezent, schemele de ajutor de stat destinate industriei au vizat în principal reducerea costurilor indirecte de emisii și a costurilor de energie, fără a stimula în mod eficient transformarea industrială. Pentru a susține continuarea activității industriale pe termen mediu și lung, ajutoarele de stat ar trebui condiționate de cerințe de reducere a emisiilor dar și țintite către noi tehnologii și procese de producție industrială. Asemenea scheme de suport trebuie lansate urgent, având în vedere calendarul de eliminare a alocărilor gratuite de certificate de emisii pentru industria energo-intensivă, conform reviziei Directivei EU ETS. Din 2034, aceste sectoare industriale vor plăti integral pentru emisiile generate.   În septembrie 2024, Guvernul a lansat prima schemă amplă de ajutor de stat destinată tranziției industriei românești, ca parte a “Planului Național pentru Marea Industrie”. Schema de ajutor, în valoare de 1 miliard de euro, este destinată investițiilor în măsuri de reducere a emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră, și va acorda un sprijin de până la 100 de milioane de euro per beneficiar. Anunțul schemei vine la puțin timp după lansarea în consultare publică a Programului-Cheie 7 din Fondul de Modernizare, de asemenea destinat susținerii operatorilor industriali prin finanțarea investițiilor de modernizare și eficientizare energetică a instalațiilor. Bugetul total al programului este de 150 de milioane de euro, cu sprijin maxim de 30 de milioane de euro per beneficiar. Deși schemele reprezintă un semnal binevenit din partea decidenților români, acestea nu vor reuși să stimuleze transformarea profundă a industriei grele, dacă nu sunt bine calibrate la magnitudinea acestei transformări. Măsurile de sprijin ar trebui țintite către proiecte de impact în sectoarele cele mai vulnerabile în procesul de tranziție și care prezintă un avantaj competitiv. Schemele de ajutor de stat ar trebui să fie dimensionate proporțional cu efortul financiar necesar pentru transformare și suficient de flexibile pentru a absorbi volatilitatea costurilor pe termen lung asociate transformării, inclusiv prețul carbonului din piața EU ETS. În caz contrar, Planul Național pentru Marea Industrie riscă să cheltuiască în mod ineficient resursele publice, scăzând totodată șansele industriei românești de a ține pasul cu competitori din alte țări europene. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. She is passionate about volunteer work, being one of the founding members of European Youth Energy Network and a professional speaker for conferences dedicated to the role of youth in energy transition. Contact: luciana.miu@enpg.ro

Pe fondul unor temperaturi caniculare extreme, sistemul energetic național a întâmpinat dificultăți în satisfacerea cererii de consum la orele de vârf în ultimele săptămâni. Contrar unor opinii vehiculate în spațiul public, această situație critică nu a fost cauzată de adoptarea unui calendar de eliminare a capacităților pe bază de cărbune. De fapt, centralele pe bază de combustibili fosili au produs semnificativ sub capacitățile instalate teoretic disponibile în sistem, necesarul fiind acoperit prin creșterea importurilor. Pentru evitarea unor situații similare în viitor, este necesară accelerarea investițiilor în rețelele de distribuție și transport, creșterea capacităților de producție de energie cât mai curată, și a sistemelor de stocare, precum și dezvoltarea suplimentară a capacităților de interconectare cu alte state. Alexandru Ciocan, EPG Researcher, Energy Systems Team Alexandru Ciocan este cercetător la Energy Policy Group și a lucrat intens timp de aproape 10 ani în domeniul tehnologiilor bazate pe hidrogen, surse de energie regenerabilă și baterii litiu-ion. Deține un doctorat în științe inginerești de la IMT Atlantique, precum și de la Universitatea Politehnica din București. Contact: alexandru.ciocan@enpg.ro

Independent scientific advisory bodies are consultative organisations composed of various experts with the role of advising governments on climate policy and monitoring progress towards reaching climate targets. Their overarching role includes identifying the shortcomings in climate policy and offering scientific advice to improve it. Climate policy would thus be enhanced by linking the latest scientific evidence to policymaking and filling the gap left by the lack of institutional capacity and in-house expertise of the government. Through this influx of expertise, Romania could also gain more ownership over its climate policies, by enabling domestic debate and initiative, rather than merely transposing EU legislation. Ana-Maria Niculicea, EPG Researcher, Clean Economy Team Ana-Maria Niculicea is a Researcher at Energy Policy Group focusing on aspects relating to climate governance and the social acceptance of the transition. She holds a MSc in Politics, Economics and Philosophy from University of Hamburg and a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.  Contact: ana.niculicea@enpg.ro

Regulamentul privind industria net-zero (NZIA), adoptat la sfârșitul lunii mai, marchează o nouă abordare a politicii industriale în Uniunea Europeană. Noul regulament vine ca răspuns la o îngrijorare crescândă că industria Uniunii își va pierde competitivitatea într-o lume cu emisii reduse de dioxid de carbon (CO2). Fiind încă dependentă de industria grea, dar având și un mare potențial de a dezvolta noi industrii născute din nevoia de decarbonizare, România ar trebui să privească NZIA ca pe o șansă de a deveni un jucător în industria cu emisii reduse de dioxid de carbon, precum și de a depăși barierele instituționale care împiedică de prea mult timp această dezvoltare. Potențialul românesc acoperă un număr de industrii-cheie, cum ar fi energia regenerabilă, producția de hidrogen verde și captarea și stocarea carbonului (CCS), unde dispozițiile NZIA privind accelerarea proceselor de autorizare pot stimula semnificativ investițiile. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@enpg.ro

It is difficult to overstate the urgency and magnitude of Romania’s industrial transformation. Heavy industry sectors such as steel, cement, and chemicals employ thousands of workers and are key contributors to the national economy. But their conventional, carbon-intensive processes are becoming increasingly obsolete in a world rapidly moving towards sustainable forms of production, as the competitive edge in industry slowly shifts from cheap to green. Transforming these processes is a sizeable challenge, but also an opportunity of significant proportions. By 2034, Romania’s steel, cement, and chemicals manufacturers, all sectors deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage, will no longer benefit from exemptions from paying for their emissions. In today’s carbon prices, this could mean costs of €60 million per year just for emissions for a plant producing 1 million tonnes (Mt) of cement; close to double if EU carbon prices rise as predicted by some models. There is one decade left for Romania’s heavy industry to slash its emissions in order to continue operating and competing. This is just about enough time to assess feasibility, make an investment decision, secure new equipment and technologies from an increasingly oversubscribed market, install, test, and phase in these new technologies and processes, and reskill the workforce. All this under the optimistic assumption that Romania’s existing infrastructure is fit for purpose, new infrastructure has been deployed to the required scale, and state support is forthcoming to leverage the massive required investments. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@enpg.ro

În 2024 România ar trebui să își regândească modelul de dezvoltare economică printr-o reorientare către tehnologiile viitorului și tranziția către o economie cu emisii reduse de gaze cu efect de seră. Pentru aceasta este necesară renunțarea la apatia clasei politice și la căutarea soluțiilor în trecut și reorientarea priorităților naționale către o economie bazată pe utilizarea surselor de energie curată, dezvoltarea infrastructurii energetice, atragerea lanțurilor valorice pentru tehnologiile verzi și susținerea capacității de cercetare și inovare pentru crearea de locuri de muncă bine plătite, care să poată răspunde provocărilor următoarelor decenii. Mihnea Cătuți, EPG Head of Research Mihnea is the Head of Research at EPG, coordinating the research strategy and activities within the organisation. His expertise includes EU climate and energy policy and the transition in South-East Europe.He is also an Associate in E3G’s Clean Economy Programme, contributing to the work on industrial decarbonisation. In the past, Mihnea was an associate researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), where he led the work on the future of hydrogen in the EU. He was also an associate lecturer in Public Policy at the University of York. Mihnea has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Bristol and a Masters in European Public Policy from the University of York and the Central European University. He is currently finalising his PhD at the University of York focusing on energy and climate governance in the EU. Contact: mihnea.catuti@enpg.ro

Spre deosebire de emisiile operaționale de carbon, care țin de consumul de energie în clădire și care fac obiectul măsurilor de creștere a eficienței energetice, emisiile încorporate ale clădirii sunt cele care țin de materialele de construcții și de activitățile de construcție, precum și de tratamentul la finalul duratei de utilizare. De aceea, contribuția sectorului clădirilor – care, în UE, reprezintă mai bine de 40% din consumul total final de energie – la realizarea unei traiectorii de neutralitate climatică până în 2050 nu poate fi realizată fără controlul și reducerea emisiilor încorporate de carbon.

Deși capacitățile de producție industrială s-au micșorat semnificativ în ultimele 3 decenii, acestea păstrează o contribuție de 16.5% la valoarea adăugată brută națională, și asigură aproximativ o cincime din forța de muncă activă din România. Având în vedere această importanță economică strategică, producătorii de oțel, ciment, chimicale și produse petroliere trebuie să se adapteze rapid la noua realitate a industriei europene, marcată de constrângeri în privința emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră.

From the second half of March to June 2023, four rounds of revisions have been submitted for the Electricity Market Design during the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU, bringing useful clarifications. The present analysis also reflects the main elements of the Presidency’s compromise proposal.

Within this new reality and the ensuing global crisis, COP27 was seen by some as an “oasis of diplomacy”, to quote US Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm – a space where countries could come together to act on the global challenge that is climate change. But while countries did come together in some landmark agreements, they left Sharm-el-Sheikh without much progress on actual action to mitigate climate change.

The concept of circular economy (CE) has become one of the most important pillars of climate change mitigation efforts as its implementation seeks to decouple economic growth from resource use.

The Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) is an essential instrument for achieving the energy and climate objectives of the European Union (EU). The recast EED aims to align its provisions – since many of them require increased ambition and enhancement of their scope – with the target of 55% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030.

Fondul pentru Modernizare (FM) este cel mai important instrument financiar european destinat susținerii tranziției energetice în țările Europei Centrale și de Est până în 2030.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a heavily debated legislative proposal for a carbon tax on EU imports from five key sectors (aluminium, cement, fertilizer, iron and steel, and electricity). [1],[2] It has been proposed as part of the Fit for 55 package, with the purpose of preventing carbon leakage (the relocation of carbon-intensive production of tradable goods away from the EU, to avoid carbon costs).

The current version of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) is deemed outdated and misaligned with the EU agenda of promoting renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reduction. The European Commission’s ETD proposal is a unique opportunity to address some of the missing pieces of the current framework and sets the ground for encouraging the roll out of new, sustainable technologies and products by: building the tax rates based on the energy content and environmental impact, widening the taxation base, by including energy sectors that are not in the scope of the current ETD (aviation, shipping), developing mechanisms to incentivize new energy carriers and technologies, such as hydrogen and storage.

The current Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) is being amended, as part of a broader overhaul of EU climate and energy legislation, to update the target and the legislation for delivering at least a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. The European Commission’s RED revision is the key EU legislative instrument for promoting the uptake of renewable energy sources and lays the foundation for higher RES targets at EU level and in every member state, mainstreaming renewables in buildings, H&C, industry, and transport.

The sudden interest for hydrogen in Romania is lacking though a robust foundation in policy analysis and planning, having been fueled almost entirely by the momentum that the topic has received at EU and international levels.

Although sanctioned in the press as a populist and anti-economic measure, the draft law on deferral of payment to utilities for three months, is based on a correct idea of social protection.

The global oil industry will continue to be battered by the constraints of climate policies, divestment and lowering returns. True, a depressed oil price environment disincentivizes investment in renewable energy sources, electromobility and, alas, energy efficiency – a lesson well learned in the aftermath of the 2014 oil industry downturn.

The fundamental market drivers are pointing at a balanced oil market in 2020, with a Brent price mostly within the $60-70 a barrel – unless, that is, a massive escalation of the geopolitical tensions occurs, following the targeted killing of Iranian general Soleimani, causing large and indeterminate oil supply disruption.

The analysis carried out in this report shows that the manner in which the NECP draft accommodates the net increases in electricity generation capacity by 2030 for virtually all forms of primary energy – except for the natural gas units, whose aggregate capacity stagnates, and of coal, for which an implausibly low decrease is expected – is to rely on a massive increase in final energy consumption to 341 TWh in 2030 compared to 269 TWh in the PRIMES 2016 projection, and 300 TWh in the Romanian Energy Strategy 2019-2030, with an Outlook to 2050

How could Romania capitalize on such consistent evidence about how energy efficiency can actually work to the benefit of a state and its energy stakeholders?

In Romania, the National Energy Regulation Agency (ANRE) has so far approved 36 SM pilot projects in 2015 and 2016 for all eight distribution areas, targeting approximately 270.000 points of delivery out of a total of 7.18 million, which means less than 4% of the population.

This paper traces the history of how states came to cooperate in the development of offshore cross-border oil or gas deposits. First, it explains the shift in how a state´s offshore has come to be viewed from “open to all” to sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone and finally to cooperation in the interest of all parties concerned. Secondly, it discusses the types of agreements states signed and the problems these agreements solve.

Some say statistics lie and this is sometimes true. However, oftentimes statistical figures are so striking that underlying facts become obvious. At the European level, the irrigation systems differ a lot by technology, but also in terms of irrigable and irrigated areas. According to 2013 data provided by Eurostat, there are important discrepancies between member states.

Natural gas is the most important form of energy in Romania’s the final consumption structure. In 2015, gas accounted for 29% of the total demand, followed by oil products with 26%, 19% renewable energy sources (RES (including hydro), 17% coal and 9% nuclear energy. Gas consumption is almost equally divided between the domestic and industrial sectors – in the latter gas is used primarily in the production of electricity and as raw material in petro chemistry.

Important market players already bet that days with oversupply of crude oil will soon to be outdated and that the market will return to balance – and therefore back in the situation backwards.

Plummeting oil prices and fallen revenues triggered a chain reaction in Turkmenistan, which has a current account deficit of about $6 bn. Ashgabat devalued the currency by 19%. There have been reports of massive food shortages and unpaid wages.

Given that Romania is quickly moving towards the completion of a centralized natural gas trading market – including through the elimination, from April 2017, of the predetermined price for the internal production of natural gas – it is necessary to make use of the current mechanisms and specific regulations, and to introduce new ones, to limit the effects of possible massive price volatility caused by speculative behavior

The Energy Ministry posted on December 19 the Energy Strategy of Romania 2016-2030, with an Outlook to 2050. It has been a long-awaited document, on which stakeholders have for years pinned hopes about favored energy policies and from which decision-makers, public and private, expect guidance in the coming years.

Romania’s capacity auction is a significant step in regional gas market opening. At the end of July 2016, Transgaz has signed gasinterconnection agreements with its Bulgarian and Ukrainian counterparts in order to increase interconnectivity and allow bidirectional flow from Ukraine to Greece.

The introduction of the additional tax must be fair, proportionate, reasonable, fair, and the level of taxation must be determined according to objective, rational financial criteria corresponding to the taxpayer contribution (according to the Romanian Counstitutional Court practice)

In Romania, a number of industrial sectors that serve the public interest are strictly regulated – natural gas, railroad or electricity systems, to name a few. As such, for the local energy sector, and particularly for electricity, the transmission and distribution services are regulated as “natural monopolies”

During the evolution of the Romanian oil industry, the refining sector emerged at the end of the 19th century by way of a massive import of foreign capital and advanced technology. In 1895 the construction of Steaua Română refinery started in Câmpina, one of the largest in Europe of that time, with capital of Deutsche Bank.

The creation of a regional balancing market calls into question the commercial viability of the classical electricity generation capacities which ensure, at the national level, this service.

Nobody can deny the sovereign right of states to charge taxes on any activity including petroleum activities. It is of utmost importance when, why and namely how such fiscal measures are established.

Our case study of worst practices involves two-state owned businesses, Hunedoara Energy Complex and Oltenia Energy Complex. They are both nearly insolvent, while the Government continues to pump money into their rescue, without, however, any real assurance that the effort will be worth it

Photovoltaic is a unique concept, if looked at how fast this technology has been growing. In the next decade, global demand could be significantly fueled by solar power. Today, just 0.5% of the electricity comes from photovoltaics worldwide. It may seem like a small number, but in 1998 this was 0.003% and if the trend continues, in 2028 it will grow to 50%. Therefore, by then half of the energy demand could come from solar-powered plants.

For Romania to increase its biogas production 50-fold, a step change is necessary, even if the level of support is sufficient to make most investments profitable.

The 2018 calendar was supposed to bring a 3% increase in household gas prices as of 1 October 2014, as a first step towards timely liberalization. In light of the burden that would have thus fallen on households ahead of presidential elections held in December, the Government, through its Department of Energy, requested this delay.

The Iaşi-Ungheni interconnector is a 43 km long pipeline meant to transport up to 1.5 bcm of gas per year from Romania to the Republic of Moldova, under the Prut River that constitutes the border between the two countries. Construction works only took one year, but they followed three years of talks between the two parties. Costs reached a total of €26.4m, most of which was covered by Brussels and Bucharest.

Compared to oil products, natural gas is clean burning, with virtually no particle and sulphur emissions, close to no NOx emissions, and lower CO2 emissions. Increasingly, it is also more affordable, despite higher logistics costs. Romania should follow the lead of many other countries around the world, and consider incentives for ship and truck owners to switch to natural gas.

Industrial competitiveness gains more and more traction across EU`s energy policy.

For the energy public debate in Romania, there are often two seemingly interchangeable terms – security and energy independence. The two concepts are different, however, and understanding the differences is very important

Romania's most important foreign energy policy project, the Nabucco gas pipeline, failed definitively in June 2013, when the competition for the transport of Azerbaijani gas to the EU in favour of the TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline) project.